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[B]y the omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete [the 
Sherman Act] indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to 
contract when not unduly or improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the 
prevention of monopoly… 
[T]he  right  to  freely  contract  was  the  means  by  which  monopoly  would  be 
inevitably prevented …  
     Justice White in Standard Oil (1911),
1 emphases added. 
 
  The freedom to switch suppliers lies close to the heart of the competitive process 
that the antitrust laws seek to encourage.  




Antitrust analysis considers both process and outcomes.  That is, it asks both 
whether an activity or agreement interferes with the competitive process and whether it 
leads to outcomes that are inefficient and/or injure consumers.  The mix of these two 
strands of analysis varies.  For example, horizontal merger analysis is almost entirely 
outcome-focused,  while  cartel  enforcement  scarcely  addresses  outcomes  at  all;  form-
based and effects-based analyses continue to contest other areas of antitrust. 
Recent  decades  have  seen  increasing  weight  placed  on  direct  analysis  of 
outcomes.  Some commentators even suggest that whether an act is anticompetitive turns 
by  definition  on  whether  its  outcome  will  be  bad.    Courts,  on  the  other  hand, s t i l l  
frequently stress the competitive process, even when they may not be particularly clear 
about what that process is. .  
We  take  a  step  toward  understanding  what  the  competitive  process  entails, 
because we side with the courts in thinking that an analysis of impacts on the competitive 
process should remain central to antitrust.  
A very intuitive and robust benefit of competition is that if firm A is greedy or 
incompetent, consumers can trade with firm B instead.  Firm A would of course love to 
thwart the formation of this improving coalition, and might sometimes be able to do so, 
as we illustrate below.  These observations suggest a perspective that the competitive 
process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. 
We explore below the idea that the competitive process centrally involves the 
freedom to strike better deals.  From this perspective much—though by no means all—of 
antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain or thwart improving trade 
between their rivals and customers, echoing the Sherman Act’s ban on agreements in 
“restraint of trade.” In this way antitrust protects B’s and consumers’ freedom to trade to 
their mutual betterment.
3 
We also illustrate how some antitrust controversies arise when firm A itself is an 
essential participant in the improving coalition.   
                                                 
1 Standard Oil v. United States 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
2 NYNEX v. Discon 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998). 
3 Antitrust prohibits certain things (all statutes do), but it is a shallow paradox to 
observe that laws protecting freedom can take the form of prohibitions. (For instance, 
laws against kidnapping prohibit certain conduct but clearly protect freedom.) Page 3 of 10    
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1.  Outcomes,	 ﾠProcess,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCore	 ﾠ
An entirely outcome-focused view would define restraints of trade as practices or 
agreements  that  lower  economic  (consumer  or  total)  surplus,  perhaps  measured  by 
quantity traded, in a market.  Some mainstream antitrust commentary might approach this 
view.  Posner [2001, p.22] views the “completed act” of violating section 1 as “an actual 
restriction of output,” while Posner [1976, p. 53] argues that “antitrust policy is to be 
shaped by the monopoly problem” after explaining that monopolies lower output and 
raise price, relative to the perfectly competitive level or the level that would otherwise 
obtain.  Similarly, Hovenkamp (2006, ch. 1) frames his “legal and economic structure” 
using outcome measures.  Bork [1978, p. 51] states that “[t]he only legitimate goal of 
American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare.”
4 
The freedom-to-trade perspective, in contrast, stresses the freedom of buyers and 
sellers to change their trading partners whenever that is mutually beneficial.  The aspect 
of  the  competitive  process  that  we  study  here  is  buyers  and  sellers  exercising  this 
freedom and forming improving coalitions (i.e., new configurations of trading partners).  
In a highly competitive market a seller who does not give its customers good 
deals will find that rivals offer better deals to attract these customers.  The process of 
firms fighting over customers and offering them better and better deals raises consumers’ 
utility skyward.  This competitive process is closely aligned with what Schumpeter called 
creative destruction. 
  Until the outcome reaches what economists call the core, an improving coalition 
of buyers and sellers is always possible and the competitive process will continue. In fact 
the core is defined as the set of outcomes or payoffs from which no coalition of people 
improve their payoffs by simply trading among the coalition.   
Because it is framed in terms of payoffs and is flexible as to institutions and 
modes of trading, the core is more meaningful than perfectly competitive equilibrium in a 
broad range of markets of interest to antitrust.  As Edgeworth (1881: p. 31) wrote,  
 
“[the  core]  is  attained  when  the  existing  contracts  can 
neither be varied without recontract with the consent of the 
existing  parties,  nor  by  recontract  within  the  field  of 
competition. The advantage of this general method is that it 
is  applicable  to  the  particular  cases  of  imperfect 
competition; where the conceptions of demand and supply 
at a price are no longer appropriate.”  
Outcomes in the core are efficient, making the core a reasonable ideal to pursue if we 
judge by outcomes.
5  
                                                 
4 By consumer welfare Bork means (confusingly) what is more often called total 
welfare; but our point here is that he asserts that antitrust is outcome-focused. 
5 However, the proof that outcomes in the core are (Pareto) efficient relies on the 
prospect  of  forming  the  “grand”  improving  coalition  containing  everyone  in  the Page 4 of 10    
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Traditionally, antitrust commentators think of the outcome ideal or benchmark as 
the  perfectly  competitive  equilibrium  in  which  firms  are  price  takers;  this  naturally 
inspires them to focus on acquisitions and maintenance of market power (i.e., power over 
price) as a problematic outcome, but does not provide much guidance of what process 
(i.e.,  what  kinds  of  acquisitions  or  maintenance)  are  anticompetitive  and  should  be 
condemned.  Grinnell  famously  and  unhelpfully  identifies  “willful  acquisition”  as  its 
process prong.
6  On the other hand, if the outcome ideal is the core, as we consider here, 
then the process focus shifts to a search for whatever restrains, thwarts or blocks the 
formation of improving coalitions; this provides meaningful guidance of what constitutes 
a process violation.  
Perversely (to our minds) most discussion of the core in antitrust appears to have 
fretted that, with large fixed costs, the core might be empty, so that the competitive 
process will never reach closure and assumed that the resulting creative destruction must 
be worse than a non-competitive “equilibrium.”
7 
2.  Freedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠHorizontal	 ﾠAgreements	 ﾠunder	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ
  
To illustrate this view of the competitive process as freedom to trade, suppose that 
suppliers A and B collude and agree to charge a high price H.  If their contract were 
legally binding, it would prohibit either from trading with a buyer at a lower price L < H.
8  
In the case of a buyer who pays H to buy from A, the contract thwarts the {B, buyer} 
coalition that would otherwise improve on the status quo for its members.  The contract 
thus restrains the freedom of B and the buyer to trade. 
Typically, of course, a cartel does not contemplate court enforcement; rather, A 
indicates that if B attracts buyers by offering a better deal, A will punish B.  This threat 
discourages the otherwise improving coalition. B is not entirely “free” to cut price so as 
to  trade  with  the  buyer,  because  A  will  punish  him  for  doing  so.    Thus  viewing 
competition  as  centrally  involving  freedom  to  trade  shows  how  cartels  are  a  core 
violation of Section 1, which may “explain” the per se treatment of cartels in a more 
fundamental  way  than  the  courts’  mantra  that  “experience”  shows  that  they  almost 
always lead to bad outcomes. 
  Readers  may  ask  why  {A,B}  isn’t  an  improving  coalition  relative  to  the 
competitive  outcome:  why  doesn’t  our  interpretation  of  antitrust  as  freedom  to  trade 
fatally  include  freedom  to  collude?  In  the  language  of  the  core,  {A,B}  is  not  an 
improving coalition because a coalition with only sellers yields no surplus: worthwhile 
                                                                                                                                                
economy.  If such coalitions are very hard to form, it becomes an appealing hypothesis 
rather than a theorem that the formation of improving coalitions tends toward efficiency. 
6 United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
7 See generally Telser (1978); Sjostrom (1989) argues that the core may be empty 
in ocean shipping and asserts that this would justify cartels. 
8 Even if A and B are bound to their collusion by honor alone, an agreement not to 
deal with one another’s customers restrains trade and discourages each from forming an 
improving coalition with the other’s customers. Page 5 of 10    
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coalitions include the trading partners.  And {A, B, customers} with trade at H does not 
“improve on” the competitive outcome because customers are worse off.
 9   
Maricopa may illustrate the view that restraining rivals’ trade is illegal even in the 
face of a natural intuition that the effects might not be bad.  The Court decided it was per 
se illegal for doctors to agree on maximum prices—that is, to agree not to charge more 
than certain prices.  In an outcome-focused approach, the Court’s per se condemnation 
would be puzzling. After all, maximum prices would seem likely to expand output (if 
doctors have market power or information rents), suggesting at least a need for more 
analysis. On the other hand, the doctors were nakedly restraining one another’s freedom 
to trade; for instance, each doctor was agreeing not to compete away business from the 
others by offering very high quality service at high prices. A freedom-to-trade approach 
appears to better explain the result in Maricopa than an outcome approach.   
However, we do not suggest that outcomes can be ignored.  To do so might risk 
returning  antitrust  to  pre-Chicago  Board  paradoxes  such  as  whether  all  contracts  are 
illegal restraints or whether all trade restrains other trade.  In ASCAP and BMI, the Court 
declined to apply the per se rule.
10  Although the case literally involved fixing a price for 
the  blanket  license,  each  copyright  holder  remained  free  to  trade  on  his  own  with  a 
licensee.
11  One could thus analyze the case by saying that the blanket licenses did not 
limit anyone’s freedom to trade.  Alternatively, if one did view collective pricing of the 
blanket  license  as  limiting  freedom  to  trade,  a  court  might  allow  the  limitation  if 
efficiencies are sufficiently compelling.  
In Engineers, engineers agreed not to quote a price until a customer had engaged 
a particular engineer.  They argued that without this restriction, customers would choose 
low bidders, engineers would cut corners, and bridges would fall down.  That defense 
goes to efficiencies, not to whether the horizontal agreement limits freedom to trade. A 
court might concern itself exclusively with the competitive process, and strike down the 
agreement; or it might evaluate the efficiency defense. The Court took a confusing path 
somewhere in between.  It points out that consumers can trade off quality against price, 
potentially the germ of a real efficiency analysis, but did not engage with an implied 
efficiency  theory  involving  consumer  irrationality.  The  short  shrift  given  to  the 
engineers’  defense  is  more  compatible  with  a  focus  on  restraints  of  the  competitive 
process than with a focus on outcomes. 
Illustrating some of these tensions and interweavings of process and outcome, 
consider an art dealer D who agrees to sell a painting to buyer A in a week for $500, but 
leaves  it  hanging  in  his  gallery.    Buyer  B  arrives  mid-week  and  offers  $750  for  the 
painting.  The forward contract between D and A prevents D from selling to B at the 
higher price.  Does it “restrain” the freedom of B and D to trade to their mutual benefit 
and thwart an improving coalition {D, B}?   
Had D and A entered a spot contract instead of a forward one, and had A taken 
the painting home with him, then when B arrived, D would plainly have no painting, so 
{D,B} would not be an improving coalition (let alone one that is thwarted).  Inspired by 
                                                 
9 In principle one should specify the terms on which members of a coalition trade; 
in some cases we take the liberty of leaving that implicit. 
10 Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
11 This right to bypass ASCAP was the product of a prior antitrust settlement. Page 6 of 10    
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this observation, one could analyze the forward sale by saying that {D, B} is not an 
improving coalition because the painting is already sold even though it still hangs in the 
gallery.  Here, and in many situations, this may be the soundest answer. 
Another  tack  (less  compelling  in  this  instance  but  perhaps  helpful  in  others) 
would say that the forward sale did limit {D, B}’s freedom to trade, but might yet not 
violate Section 1.  First, the forward sale may well have helped D and A to trade in the 
first place, so it might on balance increase freedom to trade. This approach would try to 
balance pro and anticompetitive effects in terms of the competitive process, not directly 
balance efficiencies.  Second, even if forward sales hinder the competitive process, one 
might allow them if they greatly improve efficiency.  This approach would try more 
directly to balance inefficient outcomes against anticompetitive restraints.  
3.  Freedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠMonopolization.	 ﾠ
As  the  quotation  from  Justice  White  suggests,  Section  2  tries  to  ensure  that 
monopolies do not thwart others’ incentives to trade around a greedy or incompetent 
monopoly.    This  might  suggest  glossing  Section  2  as:  A  monopoly  may  not  block 
improving trade between customers and rivals who would offer customers a better deal. 
How, if at all, can a monopoly do that?  Raising rivals’ costs can do it: consider 
sabotaging a key rival’s factory, or threatening customers who deal with rivals.
12  Less 
obviously,  we  show  below  how  a  firm  might  discourage  improving  coalitions  using 
pricing—not price levels but pricing patterns.  A low price may exclude, but only by its 
merit: that is, only by offering customers a genuinely good deal.  But a pricing pattern, it 
turns out, can hinder the competitive process by forcing rivals to compete against a price 
lower than the price that customers pay. 
To see how this can happen, we first note two simple models in which it fails.  
First,  suppose  that  n  firms  each  set  a  price  simultaneously.    Each  firm’s  price  to 
consumers is also the price against which its rivals compete.  If a rival offers a better 
deal, it gets the business. 
Second,  in  the  contestability  model  of  Baumol,  Panzar  and  Willig  [1982],  an 
incumbent sets a price, and potential entrants make entry decisions knowing that (for long 
enough at least to recoup sunk costs of entry) they can compete against that price.  Again, 
if a rival offers a better deal than what customers pay the incumbent, the rival wins the 
business.    
Reflecting the powerful intuition of such models of simple price level, Posner 
(2001: p. 34) wrote: 
 
The framers of the Sherman Act were concerned with the 
“trust” problem, but what they conceived that problem to 
be is obscure, and indeed contradictory.  They seem to have 
                                                 
12 As this sentence indicates, otherwise-improving trade between a rival and a 
customer could be discouraged from either end.  Blowing up a rival’s factory is a popular 
hypothetical  in  antitrust  commentary:  see,  for  example,  Roundtable:  Recent 
Developments in Section 2, Antitrust Magazine, Fall 2003, p. 20.  Somewhat similarly, 
Conwood involved a claim that one firm ruined another’s sales displays. Conwood v. 
United States Tobacco 290 F. 3d 768 (2002).  Page 7 of 10    
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been concerned with low prices harmful to small-business 
competitors  of  the  trusts…  as  well  as  with  high  prices 
harmful to consumers. …Protecting competitors from low 
prices and consumers from high prices are incompatible 
objectives,  with  a  few  rare  exceptions,  such  as  when  a 
monopolist prices below cost in an effort to intimidate a 
potential entrant. 
Indeed, if competition involved simply naming one price, that price could not 
simultaneously be too high and too low.  But the contradiction disappears if the price 
confronting competitors is not the price that consumers pay.   
For instance, monopoly M charges a high price H, but would cut its price upon 
entry to L.  A potential rival R who knows this and who cannot compete successfully 
against L will not enter; with no entry, customers pay H.  If R could profitably attract 
buyers away from H but not away from L, then R and the buyers are not “free to trade.”  
Specifically, relative to the situation in which M charges H, there would be an improving 
coalition of R and customers, but its formation is thwarted by M’s threat to lower price to 
L.  Is M “competing on the merits,” the touchstone of competitive behavior since United 
Shoe? M’s “merits” are inversely measured by the consumer price H, but it “competes” 
using L.  In that sense, when H and L differ, M is not competing on the merits.  We say 
that a firm has moved the goalposts (thus restraining freedom to trade) if its rivals must 
compete against a price lower than the price its customers pay. 
Moving  the  goalposts  restrains  R  and  customers  from  trading  to  their  mutual 
betterment, relative to M’s pre-entry price of H.  More concretely, allowing monopolies 
to move the goalposts chills entry and may well have bad consequences (see Edlin (2002 
and  2011)).    That  said,  setting  policy  to  prevent  it  raises  very  real  difficulties,  both 
practical and conceptual.  At the conceptual level, M’s post-entry price of L represents, 
ex post, an improving coalition of M and customers, relative to R’s offer. 
Antitrust  has  long  wrestled  with  the  concept  of  exclusionary  pricing,  often 
formulated (stressing the paradox) as whether prices can be “too low.”  That formulation 
suggests a focus on the level of price, for example relative to the firm’s cost.  But, as 
suggested by the discussion above, an incumbent’s pricing pattern can restrain or tax 
potential  trade  by  others.    Here  the  low  price  is  charged  only  out  of  equilibrium: 
consumers do not benefit from it.
13  In this view, neither high pricing nor low pricing is 
itself a problem.  What is cheating is moving the goalposts, not putting them in a “bad” 
spot.    Note  that  nothing  in  this  core  logic  turns  on  the  relationship  between  the 
incumbent’s price and its costs.    
4.  Bundling	 ﾠand	 ﾠLoyalty	 ﾠPricing	 ﾠ
Suppose that buyers buy good 1 from firm A, and may buy good 2 either from 
firm A or its rival firm B.  If A worsens the terms of trade in good 1 when the buyer buys 
                                                 
13 Of course, a court would only observe a price that occurs.   A lawsuit erupts 
only if an entrant mistakenly enters anyway, and then is driven out.  But the fact that the 
case is brought only ex post does not imply that the antitrust analysis should focus on the 
ex post effects. Page 8 of 10    
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good 2 from B, the worsening creates a tax on trade between firm B and the buyer.  When 
there is significant surplus in good 1 relative to likely quantities of good 2, the tax may 
exclude trade between B and the buyer even while A charges a high marginal price for 
good 2.  In this way, much as in our monopolization discussion above, B may have to 
compete against a low price (net of the tax) even while the buyer has to pay a high price 
for incremental units of good 2 (including the tax if it buys from B).
14  
  These concerns seem to align with the general notion of moving the goalposts and 
finding a pricing pattern that hinders B-buyer trade by means other than simply charging 
low prices to the buyer.  On the other hand, the tax is avoidable if the buyer ceases to buy 
good 1 from A, so it is limited by the buyer’s surplus in good 1.  Moreover, B and the 
buyer can trade between themselves if they are willing to say goodbye to A, so there is no 
violation of plain freedom-to-trade. Thus, we see that moving goals is in some ways 
broader than restraints on freedom to trade. 
  We think that a significant set of antitrust controversies thus arise where a rival 
and buyer(s) would like to bypass a dominant firm in one line of business but where the 
buyers are not willing to eschew all trade with the dominant firm.  The pricing principle 
suggested above and the freedom-to-trade principle suggest differing answers. 
5.  Vertical	 ﾠAgreements	 ﾠ
The process-based freedom-to-trade criterion need not return us to pre-Chicago 
antagonism  to  vertical  agreements.    Consider  for  example  retail  price  maintenance 
(“RPM”), involving a manufacturer M, retailer R, and consumer C, and a retail price r at 
which R agrees with M that it will sell to C.  The RPM agreement means that R is then 
not free to charge a higher or lower price than r.  Does this restrain the freedom of {R,C} 
to trade? The tone of Dr. Miles,
15 overruled by Leegin,
16 suggested so.  But {R, C} is not 
an improving coalition: without M, it has no goods to sell or consume.
17 On the other 
hand, if one considers another retailer S, if M promises R that it won’t allow S to sell at 
p<r, one might wonder if freedom to trade is restrained. 
Consider now an exclusive distributorship.  M and R1 agree that M will supply 
R1 but not a would-be competing retailer R2.  Is freedom to trade restrained?  M could 
shift its business entirely to R2, so if {M, R2, C} is an improving coalition because R2 is 
a better retailer than R1, that coalition is free to form suggesting no restraint.  As with 
bundling, the thornier issue is whether there is an improving coalition that includes R1, 
here {M, R1, R2, C}, and whether R1’s (or jointly M’s and R1’s) refusal to negotiate 
towards  such  an  improving  coalition  “should”  count  as  restraining  freedom  of  trade.  
Some vertical agreements may restrain freedom to trade, but by no means all.   
                                                 
14  See  e.g.  Inderst  and  Shaffer  (2010)  and  Farrell,  Pappalardo  and  Shelanski 
(2010). 
15 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.W. 373 (1911). 
16 Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877. 
17 If R is also a manufacturer, there is a horizontal problem, which is not our focus 
here, so we assume that R is purely a retailer. Page 9 of 10    
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6.  Freedom	 ﾠto	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGoals	 ﾠof	 ﾠAntitrust	 ﾠ
Commentators  as  diverse  as  Bork  (1978),  Posner  (2001),  Salop(2010),  and 
Hovenkamp (2006) have argued that antitrust should seek to protect total or consumer 
welfare.  Clearly it does so, but equally clearly it is not so simple.  Antitrust doesn’t just 
fail, but explicitly doesn’t try, to protect total or consumer welfare against certain obvious 
threats, notably the exercise of legitimately acquired monopoly power by raising price. 
While  trying  to  address  those  threats  would  certainly  involve  administrative 
difficulties and could affect ex ante incentives, antitrust’s refusal to try seems proud and 
categorical rather than regretful and pragmatic.  We think that a straightforward account 
of why simple monopoly pricing is legal is found in the quotation from Standard Oil with 
which we began.  Antitrust (mainly) seeks to protect against monopoly abuse not by 
barring  deviations  from  competitive  outcomes,  but  by  safeguarding  the  competitive 
process, which we suggest involves freedom to trade.  Simply charging monopoly prices 
harms  welfare,  but  does  not  limit  rivals’  freedom  to  trade,  Justice  White’s  “surest 
protection against monopoly”. 
Antitrust  protects  the  potential  beneficial  trades  between  competitors  and 
consumers.  Since both consumers and competitors gain from such trade, this view can 
explain why both consumers and thwarted competitors have antitrust rights, even though 
antitrust protects “competition and not competitors.”  Consumers are not protected from 
all high prices, but only from those that a competitor would be happy to beat but for some 
thwarting action; this explains why a pure monopoly does not violate the law simply by 
charging high prices.  Competitors are not protected from actual everyday low prices, but 
only from tactics such as moving the goalposts that block them from giving customers a 
better deal than a monopoly does. 
Antitrust does not ban everything that reduces consumer welfare in equilibrium.  
Instead Congress banned restraint of trade and monopolization, which can be understood 
as  a  monopoly’s  erection  of  “unnatural  barriers”  (restraints)  that  “restrict  free 
competition” in the words of Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe.
18  We explored the idea 
that these prohibitions may be unified if the competitive process is understood to mean 
the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. This contrasts with the 
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